December 19, 2015

To say that Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has created confusion regarding the Second Amendment would be to understate the case. To be sure, others on the Court have subscribed to or restated his views, but his majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller [82] led the way, and he has subscribed to the restatements. 

In Heller, in the course of interpreting the Amendment, he rewrote it: by, in effect, expunging the limiting clause, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State;" by converting the phrase "keep and bear arms" — a militia reference — into "keep and carry arms;" and by reading into the Amendment "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." The last is a strange principle which suggests that it is good policy to be armed in case an argument might arise. Justice Scalia, like George Will, must have read too many old westerns.[83] 

The Amendment’s statement of purpose, quoted above, was rendered ineffective by labeling it a "prefatory clause," and declaring that it cannot limit the scope of the "operative clause," which is "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Strait forward textual analysis was abandoned, and replaced by theorizing about what the Amendment should have said. As noted below, what it should have said is an elusive concept.

Moving toward the issue in the case, Justice Scalia’s formula became "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." Upon finally reaching the issue, he narrowed the effect of the new interpretation to this ruling: "the District's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment . . . ." 

As he found rights not mentioned in the Amendment, so he found unmentioned restrictions. "[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." The last would seem to sanction all manner of restrictions on sale. I wonder if he meant that.[84] 

Until Heller, the Second Amendment had been interpreted far more narrowly. In United States v. Miller,[85] the defendant had been indicted under the National Firearms Act for transporting a short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, "not having registered said firearm as required." The District Court held that the Act violated the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Amendment pertains to militias: "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view." In his dissent in Heller, Justice Stevens summarized the Miller holding thusly: "The view of the Amendment we took in Miller — that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons — is both the most natural reading of the Amendment's text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption."

Justice Scalia instead contended that Miller’s reference to militias merely meant that "the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection", because it was not a typical militia weapon. "We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns." That interpretation was based on Miller’s statement that, when called for militia service, "men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." Justice Scalia also took the opportunity to reiterate his revision of the Amendment by asserting that the "traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense." In doing so, he reduced the reference to militias to an arms inventory, and again substituted self-defense as the right protected.

The Miller opinion is not a model of clarity, but Justice Stevens’ interpretation is more persuasive, especially as Justice Scalia’s version creates more problems than it solves.

Given the above reading of Miller, Scalia’s alleged originalism, and his contention that the Amendment must be interpreted against the background of eighteenth-century English law, one might expect him to conclude that only weapons known at the time of ratification would be protected. Early in the opinion, he seemed to reject that: "Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. . . . [T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." Later, he reversed course: "We think that Miller's ‘ordinary military equipment’ language must be read in tandem with what comes after: . . . ‘men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.’ " Again: "We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’ . . . We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ See 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769) . . . ."

How, then, does Justice Scalia protect modern weapons, which were not in common use in the Eighteenth Century, which would be dangerous and unusual compared to those which were? He might argue that modern pistols are "of the kind" used in the Seventeen Nineties, but what of other weapons? Are assault weapons merely the modern form of muskets? Apparently not; following the citation to Blackstone, he said: "It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and the like — may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause." Well, yes. May they be banned? Perhaps: "It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. . . . But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right." The "prefatory" clause recedes even further into the background. He may be saying that only handguns are protected, or perhaps adding simple types of rifles. This is the sort of confusion which arises when a court attempts to legislate.

Justice Scalia’s inventive redrafting of the Amendment is anomalous in the light of this statement of his philosophy, also found in Heller: "Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." If he really means that, there must be an exception where future judges think the original scope too narrow.

Justice Scalia ended his opinion with this partial concession: "We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution." He rejected that approach: "But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home." (The D.C. law was not an absolute prohibition, although it was very restrictive).

In McDonald v. Chicago,[86] the Supreme Court extended the Heller decision to the states. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Alito, and joined by Scalia, at one point more or less accurately recited the holding in that case: "In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense." However, at another point, it slipped in a broadening of the rule: "our central holding in Heller [was] that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home" (emphasis added). Possession of a handgun for protection of hearth and home was expanded to keeping and bearing "arms," apparently of any kind, for lawful purposes, apparently anywhere.

This year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Friedman v. City of Highland Park,[87] upheld a municipal ordinance which "prohibits possession of assault weapons or large-capacity magazines (those that can accept more than ten rounds)." The Supreme Court, apparently either believing that Highland Park conforms to Heller, or regretting the latter decision, denied review by a vote of 7 to 2. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in an opinion written by Thomas but presumably reflecting Scalia’s views. They recited the expanded McDonald formula: "a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes," but then declared that Heller "asks whether the law [being challenged] bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose . . . ."

Now the right is not possession of a handgun in the home (the actual holding of Heller), nor the use of arms by law-abiding, responsible citizens in defense of hearth and home (Heller intermediate formula), nor possessing and carrying weapons in case of confrontation (Heller general formula), nor keeping and bearing arms for a lawful purpose (McDonald), but possessing arms "commonly used for a lawful purpose." Used by whom? The military? The police, very much militarized? Even limiting the reference to the hypothetical law-abiding citizen, that would include assault rifles, which some find necessary in hunting. Indeed, the Highland Park dissent noted that the city ordinance in question "criminalizes modern sporting rifles (e.g., AR-style semiautomatic rifles), which many Americans own for lawful purposes like self-defense, hunting, and target shooting." Perhaps they are, after all, not dangerous or unusual, and merely are modern muskets.

The right may be to possess or it may be to carry ("bear"). The right may be limited to handguns or it may apply to "arms." The right may be limited to law-abiding, responsible citizens, or it may extend to anyone. It may be limited to bearing arms for lawful purposes, or it may cover possession (and carrying?) of arms "commonly used" for a lawful purpose.

Most of the discussion has to do with possession, rather than use, and limits on use are not considered, other than some references to lawful use. The Highland Park dissent apparently would not look to the use in any specific case: the issue merely is "whether the law bans [possession of] types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose." Leaving that aside, and assuming that the formula will require "lawful" use, what is the result if a given use is prohibited by local law? Might the Second Amendment override that and, if so, what is the test? Also, consider the stand-your-ground statutes, which encourage shooting people. Has the Court spread the cloak of the Second Amendment over those laws by finding "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation"?

It isn’t clear where the Court is going, which isn’t surprising, as it doesn’t seem to know either.

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82. 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

83. In the Nov. 15, 1993 issue of Newsweek, Mr. Will devoted a long article to a book by someone named Jeffery Snyder whose answer to crime - and, apparently, to mere incivility - is to arm everyone. He cited a line from a science-fiction novel that "an armed society is a polite society." Mr. Will expanded on that by reference to a novel in which the immortal line "When you call me that, smile" is found and declared: "Such was politeness in the armed society of 19th-century Wyoming."

84. I made a more extended comment on in the post of 7/6/08.

85. 307 U. S. 174, 178 (the 1939)
86. 561 U. S. 742, 780 (2010)

87. Decided 4/27/15.

November 30, 2015

On Sunday, we encountered a literal sign of the times. At the entrance of the 5^th Avenue Theater in Seattle (at a performance of The Sound of Music), there was one reading "No firearms." How did we reach the point at which more-or-less-peaceful Seattleites would need to be reminded not to pack a gun into a theater, one which counted many children in its audience?

It’s sadly true that mass shootings have become common; some have political or cultural motivation, but some merely reflect anger and real or imagined slights. They can’t be dismissed, as the NRA would do, as the acts of a few mentally disturbed people. All of them manifest the gun culture: easy access, irresponsible use.

President Obama issues an anguished response to each of the more notorious incidents, but his comments have no effect other than to prompt the usual inane complaint that he is playing politics, as if there were no political issue here. Republican leaders, even when not advocating looser gun laws, adamantly refuse to consider tougher ones because the NRA would denounce them. In addition, they seem to think, what’s the big deal about a few more gun-related deaths? As Jeb Bush put it in response to the shooting at Umpqua College, "stuff happens."

Leaving mass shootings aside, perhaps the bottom was reached as to the use of a gun to express anger — in this case at a mere inconvenience — in a Biloxi, Mississippi, Waffle House, where a waitress was shot and killed by a customer who objected to being told not to smoke in the restaurant.

November 23, 2015

The Seattle Times carried a column recently captioned "America isn’t broken; its leadership is." While there is something to be said for the former statement, and much for the latter, I think the formula gives the citizenry too easy a pass. It’s true that politics, in the sense of the actions of the political class, is in terrible shape, and there is no reason not to be frank about the primary source: the Republican Party, in action and in obstruction. Adding the failings on the Democratic side, we could, therefore, legitimately focus on "leadership" as the problem to be solved. However, that analysis avoids the root cause: too many voters choose Republicans.

At first glance, it’s difficult to see how GOP dominance will end, given the flood of money available, directed unevenly toward Republicans, and the effects of gerrymandering and voter suppression. Neither of the latter two are going to go away soon since both are the work of Republican legislatures. However, that dominance need not last forever; there are many potential votes not being cast.

An illustration came from a column by Ron Judd, also in The Seattle Times, which pointed out the irony in the passage of Initiative 1366 - the convoluted attempt to require a two-thirds majority in the Legislature for any tax increase - with only a bare majority of votes, far less than two thirds. He pointed out that the "yes" vote amounted to 16% of registered voters: a super majority rule imposed by a small minority. (The final tally put the yes vote at 19.06% of registered voters, but his point stands). According to the Secretary of State’s office, the number of registered voters, 3,975,958, is only 76% of those eligible to register (hereafter "eligible voters" or "eligibles") have done so. That would put the number of eligible voters at 5,231,524, so the yes vote on I-1366 amounted to 14.4% of eligible voters, and the total vote, yes and no, was 28.12% of the eligibles. Apart from whatever significance that has for the Initiative, it reflects a serious disconnect between citizens and their government.

It isn’t a phenomenon peculiar to Washington, or to this year’s election. In the 2014 election — an "off year" in the sense of not including a presidential race, but more significant than this year — the national turnout was 36.3% of eligible voters. As The New York Times put it, "The abysmally low turnout in last week’s midterm elections — the lowest in more than seven decades — was bad for Democrats, but it was even worse for democracy. In 43 states, less than half the eligible population bothered to vote, and no state broke 60 percent." That is indeed a problem for Democrats, but it also suggests a solution. Yes, they need to continue opposition to voter-suppression laws, but they need to get out the vote, and if demographics are any guide, there are a lot of potential Democratic votes out there. The Times attributed the poor turnout to "apathy, anger and frustration at the relentlessly negative tone of the campaigns." Not much can be done about the last, and anger, it seems to me, is more significant as a spur to conservatives than a disincentive to liberals. Apathy is the problem for Democrats. They need to present a program which people will believe is in their interest. Thus far, Bernie Sanders is one of the few to realize that.

November 15, 2015

The Roberts Court has made its mark in judicial history, although not in a way any believer in good government would admire. A recent issue of The Nation contained reviews of its most controversial decisions in an article entitled "The Case Against the Roberts Court: A Decade of Justice Undone." Included were District of Columbia v. Heller, (guns), Citizens United v. FEC, (money in elections), Shelby County v. Holder, (voting rights), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (religious rights of corporations), along with restrictive decisions on access to federal courts, among others.[79]  The significance of three of the decisions was graphically portrayed in charts. Gun homicides per capita in the U.S. are more than four times the nearest developed nation; the ratio to the UK is about 25:1. "Outside group" spending on elections was about 3.5 times greater in 2012 than in 2010, the year of Citizens United, and the ratio of conservative to liberal spending in 2012 was about 2.5:1.[80]  Since Shelby County, legislation restricting voting has been introduced in forty-one states. The first illustrates the uncivilized dimensions of the gun problem, which Heller made worse. The other two measure the results of the decisions.

The Nation included a review of the Court’s more liberal decisions, including recognition of same-sex marriage and rejection of efforts to invalidate the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"). However, the principal challenge to the ACA, National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, illustrates another problem: the Court’s misuse of authority. A majority, speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, held that the individual mandate — the requirement to purchase insurance — could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause.

Justice Roberts acknowledged an impact on commerce: "People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or good for society. Those failures—joined with the similar failures of others—can readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." In this case that means that those who fail to purchase health insurance drive up the cost for everyone else. "Under the Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce power to compel citizens to act as the Government would have them act." True; what is the problem? "That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned."

Why does he think that? "James Madison explained that the Commerce Clause was ‘an addition which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.’ The Federalist No. 45, at 293." Madison did say that, but he did not, as Roberts seems to imply, state that the Clause was innocuous and must not be used vigorously. Never mind: "While Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause has of course expanded with the growth of the national economy, our cases have ‘always recognized that the power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits.’ Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196 (1968)." The issue there was the reach of the federal minimum wage law; several states and a school district argued that the law could not extend to schools and hospitals operated by the states or their subdivisions. The opinion in Wirtz indeed recited the rule about limits, but did not apply it, holding that, under the Commerce Clause, the minimum-wage rules applied to the state entities. Justice Roberts’ restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause was in aid of states’ rights, so his citation of Wirtz is doubly inappropriate.

However, ignoring the holding and relying on the quote out of context, the Chief Justice concluded: "The Government’s theory would erode those limits, permitting Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.’ The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison)." However, Madison was describing the actions of state legislatures, not Congress; the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause, had not yet been adopted. Ignoring that, Roberts continued: "Congress already enjoys vast power to regulate much of what we do. Accepting the Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government." That appears to be a convoluted way of saying that the government may forbid, but may not compel, conduct, at least under the Commerce Clause. Interestingly, Roberts contrasted the limited power of the Federal Government with the broader "police power" of a State. "Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States." He approved of that despite the legislature’s habit of "drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."

Under the Affordable Care Act, the "commerce" is the health care system, of which insurance is a part, and purchasing insurance is part of that, all of which Justice Roberts acknowledged. He simply thinks that the prohibit/require dichotomy must be maintained to prevent the Government from reaching too far . However, he decided that, simply by calling the penalty a tax (and thereby removing it from the Commerce Clause and placing it under the taxing authority) it was possible to uphold it, even though the penalty is a lever to force people to buy insurance: "Although the payment [of the penalty] will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Although "the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax," it can be upheld as a tax. Pretending that the penalty is a tax is especially odd after declaring, in another part of the opinion, that it is not. However, it has this advantage for Justice Roberts’ theory: "it is abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity." Therefore Congress may not command purchase of insurance and assess a penalty for failure to do so, but it may tax the failure to do so, even though the "tax" really is a "command to buy insurance."[81]

Opinions such as this do not engender confidence.
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79. My comments on the named cases are here: Heller 7/6/08, Citizens United 2/6/10, Shelby County 7/1/13 and Hobby Lobby 7/15/14.

80. The ratios are approximate; I’ve scaled the bar charts as well as I can.

81. I discussed the opinion at greater length on 7/15/12.

 

October 29, 2015

On a recent cruise, we were the only Americans, the other one hundred ten or so passengers being Brits. Conversations tended to reveal, amid perfect courtesy, that certain American phenomena are puzzling - well, strange - to them. One of them is our endless and money-driven election season. That inevitably led to: "Is Donald Trump really running for the Presidency?" and "Might he win?"

Of course they are baffled by our gun culture, and who in his right mind would not be? Well, Ben Carson, current front-runner among the Republicans, wouldn’t. (I’m assuming that he is competent, although many of his comments give one pause). Shortly after we arrived home, the Umpqua massacre took place. Dr. Carson’s reaction included this: As a Doctor, I spent many a night pulling bullets out of bodies. There is no doubt that this senseless violence is breathtaking – but I never saw a body with bullet holes that was more devastating than taking the right to arm ourselves away." He doesn’t even have the excuse of never seeing a shooting victim; faced with the result of gun possession, his reaction is to swoon over the alleged benefits of the Second Amendment. Leaving aside his politics and the illogic of his position, the man appears to be utterly insensitive. Apparently eager to emphasize that failing, he added the boast that, had he been there, he would have rushed the gunman. In other words, it was the victims’ fault that they died.

A grass-roots reaction to the shooting illustrated how fractured, hate-filled and simply stupid our culture has become: when President Obama traveled to Oregon to console the victims’ families, he was met by hundreds gun-toting protesters carrying signs reading "Obama Go Home," "Obama Not Welcome Here" and "Go Back To Kenya." This underscores not only the fanaticism and rage of gun nuts, but the fracturing of the polity: a twice-elected President is not welcome in part of his country. He received the same reception when he went to West Virginia to talk about drug abuse: at a rally to protest environmental rules that would limit carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants, a man held a sign reading "Obama is not West Virginia’s President!"

Add a few other factors, such as the concentration of wealth at the top and the reimposition of impediments to voting, and it’s difficult to feel optimistic about the state of the Union.

August 24, 2015

Americans joining ISIS may seem bizarre — Islam is not a force here, ISIS is an aberration of Islam, etc. — but in a way it’s not surprising. It is part of a tradition or, perhaps more accurately, a trend in American culture, that of the society-rejecting loner. We see this trend in the claim of sovereign citizenship, in the law-unto-oneself violence of the NRA, in the idiots from Oath Keepers who brandish assault weapons, in the self-appointed militia who purport to guard military bases, in resistance to mandatory vaccination. We see its rhetorical form in the ramblings of conservative politicians who want to abolish the IRS or the EPA or Medicare or government in general. We see its semi-collective form in the advocacy of nullification or secession, its fully collective form in the delusions of politicians, Democratic and Republican, who think that this country can exist apart from the rest of the world. It is in short the breakdown of society, of the knowledge that no man, state or country is an island.

Mark Lilla put it this way five years ago: "A new strain of populism is metastasizing before our eyes, nourished by the same libertarian impulses that have unsettled American society for half a century now. Anarchistic like the Sixties, selfish like the Eighties, contradicting neither, it is estranged, aimless, and as juvenile as our new century."[78]  Lilla referred to the phenomenon as populism, in part because his article was focused on the Tea Party movement. The use of that term emphasizes the collective aspect, but even the seemingly collective manifestations are driven by the attitude of the self-absorbed individual. Lilla made that point clearly: this kind of populism "appeals to petulant individuals convinced that they can do everything themselves if they are only left alone, and that others are conspiring to keep them from doing just that. . . . They don't want the rule of the people, though that's what they say. They want to be people without rules — and, who knows, they may succeed."

August 7, 2015

Often when traveling there is a memorable incident, and sometimes it’s a downer; for example last year our trip ended in Paris. At breakfast on our first day there, my youthful, usually agile wife Bev fell in the hotel dining room, fractured her right hip, and spent our stay in Paris in a hospital receiving an artificial one. One of this year’s events (same city, different hotel) also was in the breakfast room but was less dramatic.

One morning we were startled by a loud announcement in French, then in English: "Attention, attention: due to a glitch in our hotel," everyone must go to an emergency exit. This left us wondering a) where is an emergency exit? b) what do we do once there? c) why are the staff paying no attention? and d) what is the French word for "glitch"? More accurately as to the last, what do the French think that "glitch" means? None of the questions was answered but the announcement ended in mid-sentence on about the ninth repetition. The glitch appeared to have been in the emergency system.

Even with the odd crisis, traveling abroad is enjoyable, and was especially so this year as our good friends the Todds joined us. On a far more elevated note than my reminiscences, Terry Todd set forth his (our) experience in Paris searching for memorials to the composer Jacques Offenbach; here is his record, slightly abused edited by me:

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The Opera Lover’s Guide to Europe, by Carol Plantamura, tells us this:

"Jacques Offenbach is, without doubt, the greatest composer of 19^th-century opera bouffe. Under the influence of his sparkling, memorable melodies and witty charm, operetta became the rage in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin throughout the second half of the 19^th century.

"Three theatres are on the operatic map because of Offenbach. We remember him today for his lyric drama Les Contes d’Hoffman and his extraordinarily catchy melodies (such as the cancan tune). But he was responsible for the worldwide popularity of operetta in the late 19^th and early 20^th century. . . .

". . . In 1850, he was appointed conductor of the Theatre Francais. Then, in 1855, he opened a summer theatre he called Les Bouffes-Parisiens in the Salle Lacaze, which was then replaced by Theatre Marigny. When he was in residence, he called the theatre Bouffes-Parisiens.

"With this name the theatre presented premieres of ten of his operettas between July 5, 1855 and July 31, 1856. Today the names of Offenbach and (Ludovic) Halevy emblazon the top of the theatre on the corner of Avenue de Marigny and Boulevard des Champs Elysees, directly across from the Grand Palais. Today the theatre holds 1,000 and presents plays." ___

"Today the theatre holds 1,000 and presents plays." Reading this was sufficient motivation for me to want to search for Offenbach when I found myself in Paris in April, 2015. Could I actually find this theatre and walk where Offenbach had walked? The theatre was still there in 1997 when Ms. Plantamura wrote her book, which included an artist’s sketching of the building, fronted by several impressive trees. Her description even included a phone number and box office hours. Would I be able 18 years later to actually go there and buy a ticket to see an opera bouffe?

I was in Paris in late April, 2015 with my wife Donna and two close friends, Jerry and Bev Day. When they asked what was on my list to see in Paris, I noted the usual---Eiffel Tower, Arch of Triumph---but especially, "I really would like to find a theatre (there were several) where Jacques Offenbach presented his operettas." Many of the operettas are in my music collection, (he composed more than 70), recorded from vinyl to cassette, and several of them I have seen in person on stage. I have for years been addicted to operetta in general, by several composers, but especially those by Jacques Offenbach. In fact, Jerry and Bev had aided by interest in this composer years ago by giving me an outstanding 1965 LP record set of The Tales of Hoffman, his only grand opera, still frequently performed today by major opera companies.

I did not want to let the opportunity pass. I was in Paris, and when would I come back if I didn’t look for the theatre now? The Plantamura book was my guide, along with a map of Paris. But I had to enlist the help of a front desk staffer at our hotel to find avenue de Marigny in the maze of streets on the map. There it was, just off the Champs Elysses, as described. It could be done; I could get there.

And we did get there, after a walk of several long blocks down the Champs Elysses from the Arch of Triumph. The drawing in the Plantamura book was accurate—it was Theatre Marigny, or Theatre Bouffes-Parisiens, as Offenbach called it. I circled the building several times to enjoy the full measure of its location and history. The building was closed, but it didn’t matter. There was a workman scurrying around, and a sign on the door said closed for remodeling. Donna did take a picture of a poster near the door, advertising the last production. I thought that probably the theatre would open again for the summer, just as it had during Offenbach’s tenure.

Two more theatres were part of Offenbach’s life in Paris. In 1856 he took over a theatre at 4 rue Monsigny and again used the name Theatre les Bouffes-Parisiens. Hitting his stride in a new venue, he sponsored a competition for young opera composers, entered by 78 hopefuls and won by Georges Bizet and Charles Lecoq. Over the next several years, 44 of Offenbach’s operettas premiered here, notably the enduring Orphee aux enfers (1858). The Plantamura book notes that today this theatre is still presenting light comedies and seats 690. Finally, there was a third theatre, also still standing. "Built in 1807, Theatre des Varietes at 7 Boulevard Montmarte experienced its heyday in the Offenbach period of the 1860s," Plantamura wrote. Among the premiers were La Belle Helene (1864), Barbe-bleue (1866),La Grande-Duchesse de Gerolstein (1867), La Perichole (1868).

I would have wanted to try to find these theatres as well, but there was only so much time in Paris, and our foursome moved on, but I was still searching for Offenbach. All I knew was that Offenbach is buried at Montmarte cemetery, and that the Montmarte district, famous as an artistic center and home to well-known 19^th-century impressionist painters, included the beautiful cathedral Sacre-Coeur, which we planned to see anyway.

The next day, after touring the cathedral, we decided to walk to the cemetery, not realizing that the walk would be about 2 miles! It did include a stroll through the narrow streets of the Montmarte district, this year the center of a city-wide March-to-September celebration in honor of Vincent Van Gogh, who had lived and painted here. We had a delightful lunch at La Cremaillere Restaurant/Cabaret, where Donna persuaded the waiter to give her the impressive menu as a souvenir. Suitable for framing, as they say. The people-watching in this area was wonderful.

Back on our feet, we started walking in the direction shown on the map for Montmarte cemetery. The streets are narrow, car traffic and parking was congested, and all the doors led to small art shops, restaurants and living quarters. There are a few small hotels for those who want the authentic Parisian lodging, but we had the impression that nothing had ever changed here. Uncertain as to whether we were headed in the right direction, and gradually tiring, we finally came upon a major thoroughfare Rue de Caulaincourt, the name shown on our map for the cemetery. Lo and behold, there it was, on both sides of the busy street, with an underpass below. The cemetery was gigantic, absolutely packed with large burial structures. And there was nobody around to answer the big question, where is Jacques Offenbach?

Thankfully, there was a display board showing where about twenty-five famous people are buried, those commonly sought by tourists, including Offenbach. We found the site, beyond the underpass below Rue de Caulaincourt, at the farthest corner of the cemetery. Donna took many photos, and we lingered for awhile.

Walking back, we noted the impressive grave sites of many important Parisians from all walks of life. Many composers, performers, artists and writers are here, honored by large structures and statues, among them Adam, Berlioz, Degas, Delibes, Dumas, Halevy, Heine, Jaubert, Jolivet, Maillart, Moreau, Nijinsky, Stendahl, Thomas, Truffaut and Zola. However, we were there for 1 ½ hours and saw only one other person—a groundskeeper.

Terence N. Todd
May, 2015